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Ryals: Monell Liability

PROOF OF MONELL LIABILITY FROM THE
PLAINTIFF'S PERSPECTIVE
Stephen M. Ryals'
Honorable George C. Pratt.
Next we take a more practical look at some of the problems in
proving municipal liability, and for that we turn to Steve Ryals,
who has had some experience in that area.

Steve Ryals:
In my world, I try to figure out the meaning of these esoteric
Supreme Court opinions and the variances between majority
opinions and the dissents, and what it all means in practice.
The most interesting proof issues in Monell2 cases arise, in my
opinion, in the police misconduct context. There are essentially
three types of cases of Moneli liability. The first is where you have
the governmental entity enacting an ordinance or regulation that
violates the Constitution.3 Those are simple cases. There is not
much in the way of interesting analysis to be made on the proof
issues.
The second case is where you have a policy maker doing
something that violates someone's rights.' The question is whether
you have found the right policy maker, and that is always a
question of State law and a question of fact as well. The second
concern is whether the policy maker's act violated the Constitution.
The first and, perhaps only, violation is sufficient to impose
1B.A. University of Missouri-St. Louis, 1981; J.D. University of MissouriKansas City, 1984. Mr. Ryals is a partner in the firm of Ryals & Soffer, in
St. Louis, Missouri. He practices in many areas of law, concentrating on Civil
Rights litigation, Section 1983 litigation, police misconduct, and employment
discrimination. Mr. Ryals has also published extensively in these areas.
2 See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
3
Bd. of County Comm'r of Bryan County v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1395
(1997) (Souter, J., dissenting).
4 Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986).
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liability. Again, there is not much in the way of interesting analysis
to do'in that case.
What is really fascinating about Monell cases are the cases under
the City of Canton v. Harris paradigm, involving either an obvious
need for some training or a pattern or custom and practice of
violations that gives rise to a need for some action. 6
Let me try to simplify, for practical use, the concepts that we have
been talking about and particularly the concepts that are described
in Professor Blum's discussion.
I think that it makes the most sense from the plaintiffs standpoint
to talk about the City of Canton rule as requiring a failure to act and
generically refer to such cases as a failure to act cases.7 As soon as
you call it a failure to train theory of liability and you write that in
your pleadings, you focus your thoughts on training as the
government deficiency. I have been burned by this and I have seen
it happen in other cases where the defense proffers a mountain of
evidence that they have trained their officers in accordance with
state law, that they have retraining, they have continuing education,
and all of a sudden your failure to train - and therefore your Monell
case does not look so good. 8 However, if you look at it in more
generic terms, as the duty of the government to act in the face of
constitutional transgressions, you are going to be better served. It
will get your thinking directed in a way that is not going to leave
you boxed in down the road.
Also, the term deliberate indifference in the context of causing a
violation, is very confusing in the application. As I read the cases,
I think the courts are confused about the application of this concept.
While deliberate indifference may be an objective standard in the
' 489 U.S. 378 (1989)
6

Id. at 388 (holding that "the inadequacy of police training may serve as a

basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
contact.").
7
1d.

8See, e.g., Grandstaffv. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987) (failure to act after shooting incident); Spell v.
McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027
(1988).
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Fourth Amendment context, in my experience and in reading these
cases, I draw the conclusion that what the courts want is something
closely akin to intent.9
I recommend to you, if you have not read Justice Souter's dissent
in Bryan County,0 read it for the education it will give you about
this area of the law. In two columns, Justice Souter describes what
we have been discussing in a very coherent and succinct fashion."
He mentions or suggests that deliberate indifference is tantamount
to intent.'2 I think that the reason it is important as a practitioner to
think about it in those terms is because as soon as you start sliding
toward thinking of it as negligence you are going to get in trouble.
A failure to act infers negligence, but clearly more than mere
negligence is required. So, if you think about it as intent, you are
never going to fall short. If you can prove intent you are never
going to be wrong.
The causation required in Monell v. New York Dept. of Social
Services'3 talks about the failure to act and the policy being the
moving force behind the violation. 4 Again, I think the only way it
makes sense is to view the action as if it requires direct causation
between the failure of the municipality and the violation.
The Bryan County case gives you cause to stop and think about
whether you have to prove a specific violation was likely to be
caused or whether mere proof of any violation will suffice.'"
You may be familiar with the Bordanaro v. McLeoaP case in
which it was proved that this department had a policy, a custom,
and long standing practice of kicking down doors without a
warrant.17 The court held that the proof was sufficient to hold the
municipality liable for the excessive force that occurred inside the
91 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.
Bd. of County Cornm'r of Bryan County v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1394
(1997) (Souter, J. dissenting).
" Id. at 1394.

121d. at 1395.
13 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
4'id. at 694.
'5 Bryan County, 117 S. Ct. at 1391.

'6 871 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989).
17 Id. at 1159-61.
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room after they kicked down the door without a warrant. 8 I am not
sure, under the Bryan County analysis, whether that proof would be
sufficient because you are talking about a policy having to do with
the search of buildings as opposed to a policy involving the Fourth
Amendment violation for excessive force.
In trying to show notice of custom and practice and failure to act,
the same evidence that shows notice will often prove what the
policy is. I think a most compelling bit of evidence is if the
department happens to have a name for what you are describing.
If the police lexicon has adopted a term that describes what you
are saying is a policy, is that not proof that they have a pervasive
practice? If it is not a pervasive practice why did they name it?
For instance, in Spell v. McDaniel,9 they had a policy of arresting
people, taking them to jail, beating them, and then talking about it
later. 2' It was called "kick ass to take names," and all the officers
knew it.' The officers were trained in this practice by the chief of
police in his own police academy."
How many of you have had a person complain that they were put
in the back of a paddy wagon and then taken for a ride where they
were injured as a result of being thrown against the sides of the
van? Do you know what they call that in some police circles? The
police call it a "screen test," because of the screen the passenger is
thrown against. "We are going to give the guy a screen test." It is
also called "waffling," as in the citizen's face looks like it came in
contact with a waffle iron.
I have had a police officer refer to an arrest as a "chump arrest."
I have heard police officers refer to bad arrests as "contempt of cop
arrests." Those are arrests where there is no probable cause.
Where the reason a person is being arrested and detained is because
they ticked the cop off and he is going to mete out his measure of
street justice. Another example, a "throw down gun" seen in

18

Id.at 1162-63.

'9 824
20id.

21 Id.

F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988).
at 1392.

at 1393.

2 Id.
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Webster v. Houston,3 demonstrates they have a policy of placing
guns in hands of people who they allege have threatened them.
Of course the ultimate trial presentation in these cases is driven by
what you do in discovery. It is important to emphasize that you
have to prepare not for trial alone but for the summary judgment
motions that inevitably follow the filing of one of these lawsuits.
In proving Monel liability, my observations and experience, and,
from reading the cases, shows that small departments are different
than large departments. Bordanaro v. Mcleod and Grandstaff v.
The City of Borger both demonstrate cases of MoneIl liability, and
both of them involved the entire night shift of a given small town
department.' The Monell case may be easier to make against a
small department.
Furthermore, the more officers you have involved in a given
transgression the more likely it is that the court is going to find that
it is part of the ingrained custom and practice of that department.
Compare that observation to Canerv. Distnict of Colwnbia,2 where
the court said the department had approximately 1,315 complaints
of police abuse over a period of time? If that is a measure of a
constitutional violation, then every large department in the country
would be guilty of violating the constitution.? So there is some
sentiment in the cases to dismiss that kind of evidence when you
have a large department and many officers coming into contact with
many citizens.
In my experience almost all successful Moneil cases have some
component of evidence that the case is made from the mouth of the
defendant officers or from a defendant witness. You would be
amazed at the quotable quotes you get from commanders. There is
one that comes to mind in Parishv. Luckie.? In that case the chief
of police said he stopped his officers from giving him use of force
23 689 F.2d 1220, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1982).
871 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1989).
767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985).
2Bordanaro,871 F.2d at 1156; Grandsaff,767 F.2d at 171.
27 795 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
2 Id. at 123 n.6.
23
Id. at 123.
30 963 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1992).
2

25
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reports because he did not want to hear about them anymore." The
plaintiff's lawyer questioned the chief on why he stopped that. The
chief responded that, "I was getting reports of too much excessive
32
force being used.
There is another case, Depew v. City of St. Marys,33 where the
chief admitted having a problem with excessive force but stated
"[a]t six bucks an hour, you take what you can get. "I Those kind
of quotes, obviously from a plaintiff s perspective, get blown up on
a big poster board and are displayed to the jury at trial.
The primary evidence you are going to develop in the proof of
Monell liability in a City of Canton case against the police where
you are trying to show notice and a failure to act will come from
department records. The primary source of department records are
internal affairs records, personnel files, and the manual. You also
have records such as the desk book, the arrest book, and memos
from inside the department.
If you look at the appendix in my materials, I copied some entries
in appendix B regarding an arrest book from a small municipality in
the St. Louis area. I do not know how probative these entries
might be. By the way, there is one particular officer who makes
reference to African-Americans in racially derogatory terms. I do
not know how probative that kind of evidence would ultimately be
in, for example, an excessive force case against that municipality. I
discovered this evidence in the context of an employment case. It
had nothing to do with Section 1983 actions but I thought it was
illustrative.
I would vigorously argue that this sort of misconduct cannot go on
in a department, generally speaking, unless the department has run
amok - unless there is a lack of supervision over the attitude and
conduct of police officers.
Now, this particular evidence in appendix B may not prove that
the department has a specific policy of, for example, using
excessive force or of wrongfully searching people. However, I
"32 Id. at 205.
Id. at 205.
33 787 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1986).
3Id.
at 1498.
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think if this was an African-American person, it would be some
evidence of that and certainly if this officer was involved it would
be great evidence of that.
In the context of internal affairs records there are many issues that
arise. The question arises whether you are going to be able to use
only the records of the officer or of the entire department. Also,
the issue arises whether the records have to involve similar
misconduct allegations or whether they can be dissimilar. In other
words, if you have a long record of complaints against the police
department about discourtesy, about bad car stops, and about failing
to answer calls, are all those kinds of records going to be
admissible and probative as to liability for excessive force?
Another problem that you have to face as the plaintiff is how you
present the internal affairs records. The issue is whether you
present mere statistics or the records themselves or anecdotal
evidence in the form of testimony from the prior complainers, or
some version of that sort of evidence.
Also, there is a really strong current, I hope it is not too strong, in
the law that says, unsustained complaints have zero value. They do
not prove anything.3s There is a recent case, Gold v. Miami, that
reaffirms that theory. ' As a plaintiff, it is very important that you
educate the court and argue strongly that unsustained complaints
demonstrate, if nothing else, that the agency should be on notice
that there is a potential problem in their department.
The quandary with sustained versus unsustained complaints is
that, if you find, when you do your discovery, that the department
has a lot of sustained complaints, the defense is going to come back
and argue that the complaints are sustained and that, therefore,
there is an effective internal affairs function. Furthermore, if you
have unsustained complaints, they are going to say, they are not
sustained because there was no merit and, therefore, there is no

'5 Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1987).
3121 F.3d 1442 (11th Cir. 1997), reh. den, 138 F.3d 836 (11th Cir. 1998).

37 Id.

at 1446-47.

' See, e.g., Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966 (3d Cir. 1996);

Saviour v. City of Kansas City, 1992 WL 135019 (D. Kan. 1992).
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problem. I am going to discuss, in a moment, expert testimony and
how you can be aided in explaining these issues with an expert.
As to internal affairs records, you have to be concerned with
whether you are talking about post-event or pre-event misconduct
allegations. As Professor Blum pointed out, post-event allegations
are relevant. In fact in the City of Grandstaffv. Borger,39 the only
evidence of policy cited by the court was the failure to properly
investigate the complaint afterwards and the indifference of the
department in relation to the event.10 There was no evidence of
prior misconduct."
There are other cases that support the
admission of subsequent misconduct allegations. Recent cases such
as Beck v. Pittsburgh4' and Vann v. New Yor, 43 support that
proposition.
The other records that aid you in presenting Monell liability issues
are the personnel files, manual of regulations, the desk book, and
the memos. If you are lucky enough to be in a municipality such as
New York, Los Angeles, Boston or Philadelphia perhaps, where
there has been a commission study on the department, there is
strong support for the proposition that you can offer the results of
the commission studies in support of Monell liability."
I
recommend that you read the decision in Gentile v. County of
Suffolk' 5 for its excellent discussion of this point.
There are sources, though you may not commonly think of them
as supporting Monell liability, that at least may educate the court. I
think that educating the court is part of what the plaintiff has to do
'9767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985).
'oId. at 170-71. The court stated that "[tihe City's consciously indifferent
training of its officers was found to be a proximate cause of [his] death." Id.
at 170.
41Id. at 171.
42 89 F.3d 966, 972 (3d Cir. 1996).
The police officer has exhibited a
pattern of inappropriate behavior of violence and excessive force within five
years, occurring after this plaintiffs experience. Id. at 972. The court noted
that since the complaints occurred within a narrow period of time, a reasonable
jury could infer that the Chief of Police "knew, or should have known, of
Officer Williams's violent behavior in arresting citizens." Id. at 973.
434 F. Supp.2d 327, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
44Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142, 148-49 (2d Cir. 1991).
4
5

Id.
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on police matters and police issues. In the Ciy of Grandstaff v.
Borger,' the judge was critical of the police for not shooting at the
tires of a fleeing suspect,4 as if that was a proper way to apprehend
the suspect. That judge needed to be educated because it has been
years since any police standards allow shooting at a vehicle or
shooting at the tires, for any reason.
There are national standards by which police activity may be
judged. Part of what you are trying to prove under Monell is that
the department deviated from some standard of conduct.
I suggest to you that there are excellent resources in this area of
law. I have cited a couple of them. Let me give you an illustration
of how they might assist you. Current professional police standards
suggest that it is important to have a use of force reporting system
within the police department because it allows commanders to
monitor the uses of force. There is a standard published by
CALEA, the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement
Agencies," which requires that a written report be submitted
whenever an employee discharged a firearm or applied force
through the use of lethal or less than lethal weapons.I Also, there
is a commentary that tells the court and everyone else why an
agency should carefully examine all incidents where its employees
have caused or alleged to have caused death or injury to another. The intent of the standard is to ensure that each event is properly
documented and the idea is that it gives the municipality notice and
the ability to monitor.
The Police Foundation, a police think-tank, has also conducted a
study on misuse of force. They also recommend that the personnel
files of the department contain similar information about discipline
records. There are resources that inform both counsel and the court
of the proper standards, and guide the municipality in what
standards they should apply or what standards should be applied.

767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985).
at 171.
48See, e.g., N.Y.Comp. CODES R.& REts. tit. 9, § 6035.9 (1998).
49See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 291-022-0030 (1997).
5See, e.g., N.J. ADmnN. CODE tit. 10A, § 3-3.8 (1999).
4

47Id.
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Ultimately, you may be aided; and I suggest a lot of the cases
encourage the use of an expert witness. Much of the evidence that
you develop - internal affairs statistics, the department manual, the
express attitudes of commanders - may be foundational for any
expert's opinion about a department's failure to act in the face of
notice of the need to act."' Without an expert to explain what the
statistics from internal affairs mean, what difference does it make?
What does it show of a police agency when they have 1,300
complaints and they only sustained 21 of them? What does that
mean? To the court in Carter,it did not mean anything. However,
it helps an expert who has skill, knowledge or training in the area
of monitoring and analyzing these issues, to explain to the court and
jury that the number of complaints for excessive force is an
indication that there is a problem in the department. Therefore,
they are on notice and if they are professionally acting police
administrators they should act, and their failure to act is actionable.
I will leave you with one thought. I once told a U.S. District
Judge that I intended to make a case of Monell liability in an
excessive force case and she looked at me and said, "Good luck."
So to all you plaintiff's lawyers, I say to you, "Good luck." To
you defense lawyers who root for the strengthening of the
preclusive laws, be careful what you wish for because you are
getting what you wish for and you are going to put yourself out of a
job.

51 See FED.

R. EviD. 70.
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